The self in social work

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Social work has a long and significant history in the use of the ‘self’. This central conceptual notion forms significant prefixes to a range of knowledge and practices at work in the helping professions. For example, self-concept, self-help, self-determination, self-awareness, self-disclosure, self-esteem, self-identity, self-efficacy, self-assessment, self-directed, self-maintenance, self-care, self-sufficiency, self-exploration (Thomas and Pierson 2006) are all current and contested ideas within social work practice and helping professions more generally.

The first part of this paper is a historical examination of the conceptualisation of the self in the contemporary era. This discussion is intimately wedded to notions of identity, ‘social’ and conceptions of the self. Although this will not be an exhaustive examination it will be indicative to provide the contours of significant developments in the understanding of and deployment of ‘self’. This discussion will review the major philosophical understandings of self, before examining the ‘self’ in social work. Recently social workers have developed the term ‘use of self’ to indicate important aspects of the professional relationship and how this term is defined rests on how one conceptualizes ‘self’.

The final part of the paper will examine how social workers describe and involve the self that they bring to their therapeutic and non-therapeutic work. Participants in case-study, narrative accounts describe the self that they bring to their work as individualistic although at the same time stress the relational, positioned, relationship-based self. This examination carries the concept of the self from the notion of self as separate and constant to the self as a process in interaction.

Keywords: self, social work, professional practice, social, process

Introduction

The first part of the paper examines competing and contested uses of self in helping professions. It starts with a historical examination of the emergence of conceptions of the self in Western, predominantly philosophical, thought. Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche are considered to gain purchase of the conception of self (Burkitt, 2008). The rise of the ‘psy of self’ adds a further dimension to how the emergent conception of the self has gained a form of institutional recognition. Finally, Foucault’s contribution of the

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technologies employed on the self are discussed. These discussions position conceptions of
the self in relation to contemporary developments.

The second part of the paper views the use of self in social work. Contested images and
representations of the self in the literature on the helping professions are examined and
three avenues are presented. The first is the way social work has responded to conceptions
of the self as a form of ‘use of the self’ from a relational and relationship-based perspective.
The second are is the ‘consciousness of the self as an instrument for intervention’. The third
is illustrative of a disassembled self as part of a learning process. These forms of self,
contribute to work-based learning in social work practice.

Conceptions of the self
The self has had contemporary expression from the ancient Hellenistic and Roman thought
(Gill, 2006), to a technologically mediated self (Jones, 2006), to being mirrored in the home
(Marcus, 2006). There is a wide and varied literature on the self that reflects the rise and
Elliot & du Gay, 2009). The seminal works on the self with rich, detailed and extended
reflections of the self are found with Siegel (2005) and Taylor (1989). The self is anchored
in conflicting discourses and competing dialogues and is shaped and formed in the
discursive apparatus in which it is evoked. Indeed, contemporary deconstructive readings of
the idea of the self in works such as Siegel’s (2005) comprehensive guide certainly mitigate
against any finality of definition. However, a historical (if partial, selective and limited)
consideration of the contribution of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche are considered
to gain purchase of the conception of self using the work of Burkitt (2008).

Western notions of the self have emerged from diverse and contradictory social, political
and cultural strands from Roman legal theory, Greco-Roman Stoic philosophy, Christian
theology and the metaphysical soul as kind of self-substance to the advent of industrial
capitalism (Burkitt, 2008: 25). Descartes contribution in Discourse on Method is that we
identify our existence through mental reflection on our own selves. ‘I think therefore I am’
possits knowledge as a construct of the human mind and a way of representing the world
that extended beyond the individual (Burkitt, 2008: 6). Through a radical doubt of
everything we know including the evidence of the senses he concludes that ‘I was a substance ... so that this ‘I’, that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body’ (Descartes, 1968 [1637]:53). From Descartes the ‘self’ becomes a thinking substance, of the non-material mind and material body, with a ‘transcendental self’ beyond the finite experience of the embodied individual. Burkitt (2008: 7) suggests the self embedded in Western thought becomes the bifurcation of the rational beings for whom the mind is paramount for Enlightenment rationalists or irrational beings ruled by bodily passions of the Romantics. Charles Taylor (1989) has argued that the ‘expressivist’ Romantic Movement in 18th century European society understood the self as something to be made through an individual’s creative expression in his history of the self. Kenny (1968) argues Descartes introduces two selves against a transcendental self by the ‘I’ that thinks and the ‘I’ that is. This dualism cannot account for the ability to bring together diverse modes of existence and a thinking and feeling embodied individual who lives in a particular place and time with life experiences and social relations and relationships. Alternative histories can be written from other cultural perspectives such as Confusianism and Buddhist (Elvin, 1985).

Kant’s Enlightenment rationalism of the Critique of Pure Reason (1966 [1781]) recognized that humans are natural beings that have sensations of the world that provide information along with desires, needs and inclinations that mitigate against reason (Seigel, 2005) so that the rational mind does not solely define the self. Kant concludes that reason must be *a priori* or prior to experience of embodied individuals to consist of the principles of reason and categories of thought to make ordered experience of the world possible (Kroner, 1955). Burkitt (2008) suggests Kant has three sense of self. First, the transcendental self that is capable of rational thought and can abstract itself from embodied social, cultural and historical circumstance, to be guided by *a priori* principles or the ‘pure ray of apperception that shines out its beam of light on the darkness and chaos of the world’ (Burkitt, 2008: 3). Second is the embodied self who puts rationality into practical action. Thirdly, Kant has the self in moral law that has a capacity to follow moral imperatives rather than individual desire. Seigel (2005) suggests there is a tension between how these selves interrelate in order to achieve unity in experience.
Following Descartes and Kant there is a strong thread of Western thought that locates the self firmly in the inner world of the individual that can then relate to society, social relations, and others from the conflicted security of a centred self. This externalising reaching out of the inner subjective self to a social self resonates through the conception of the self in contemporary society.

Hegel’s dialectical philosophy of becoming sees contradiction, opposition, difference and conflict as the driving change of an attempt to achieve unity or resolution of contradiction at a higher level of becoming. Charting the historical emergence of the self, people become self-conscious and aware of the possibility of a degree of self-making. The contradictions the self experiences, such as between thought and feeling, reason and passion, society and self, universal and particular, offer the possibility of synthesis at a higher stage. The alienated self is an unhappy consciousness aware of its present life but also its unrealized potential. The self is always in the process of becoming resolving contradictions through a process of reconstruction. Burkitt (2008: 13) suggests Hegel’s major achievement is to understand humans as social beings while retaining a notion of self as an individual in their own right but also as a product of a dialectical historical process. As such, we have a relational understanding of the creation of the individual self, in the totality of relations that exist as a matrix in which we are constituted as selves.

Nietzsche rejected the idea that the self-conscious ‘I’ could be placed at the centre of human understanding. In *The Gay Science* (1974 [1882]) Nietzsche argued consciousness is the most unfinished and weakest part of the self that is charged with mediating the instincts and turning inward to look at ourselves and deepening our self-analysis is based on our drive to guard against our own desire (Burkitt, 2008: 13). This exercise of the ‘will to power’ creates the desire to dominate our own selves and other selves. For Nietzsche, we mistakenly believe that that our identities and notion of self reside in our conscious part of the self. The solution for Nietzsche is represented in the ideal of the *Üermensch* or transcended, upper or over ‘man’. This is the ideal that a true self has yet to achieve and can only be achieved by an individual who can tame their own desires and passions, and tame the chaos and destruction in the world and affirm it all asserting joy rather than fear. These individuals can free themselves from a collective morality and create themselves as a
work of art like Goethe or Picasso. This positive affirmation is a call to self assertion that has been co-opted in ideologically motivated readings of Nietzsche. Burkitt (2008: 14) argues this challenged the emerging conceptualisation of the self in the West by rejecting the ordering of the self as a physical or a metaphysical substance.

For Marx (1990 [1848]), the social world and society is the totality of relations in which the self is constituted and located with an historical, socio-economic position so that social relations are the essence of what it is to be a self an individual located in a social framework with an identity amongst others. Capitalism alienates us from our true social and co-operative self in a practical and political project that would liberate the self from the fetters of a self made in conditions not of an individuals’ choosing.

Burkitt (2008) argues that to understand ourselves we must first abandon the image of ourselves as self-contained monads or self-possessed individuals searching for some identifying essence within that is the secret truth of self. Similarly, we are not individuals who are the proprietors of our own inherent capacities that owe nothing to society or to others. We are born into social relations that have been historically made so we are situated and embodied individuals in a context not of our choosing. Individual selves are formed from within times and places of contemporary capitalist societies (Burkitt, 2008: 189).

Authoring of self is a process and a practice that is constrained and enabled by material and interpersonal situations. Burkitt (2008: 190) argues we are particular selves in-formed by social worlds, the people to whom we are related, and with dispositions, tastes, interests and desires that guide, influence and shape our choices and actions. In this way, through exploration of these composite and conflicting selves we can approximate a unified self, a feeling of a centre to our being, of existing as ‘I’ in the world although never unified, unchanging or without contradiction, amidst a clamour of voices. Burkitt (2008: 190) suggests ‘this is a core self that is never entirely sure of itself, never completed, always in the process of some degree of change, and open to the possibility of reconstruction’. Nevertheless, there are continuities and consistency in ourselves such as self-sustaining relationships like love and friendship, and some stable dispositional tendencies on which we
act in a changing world. Giddens (1991) arrives at similar findings by charting the interrelationship of self and social relationships.

The intersection of self and social relations has been ably demonstrated and charted by Rose (1990). He provides a history of the self to conclude that we have a current regime of the self, in part constructed by psychology’s rise of profoundly ambiguous relations between the ethics of subjectivity, the truth of psychology and the exercise of power. Psychology as form of knowledge, a type of expertise, and a ground for ethics governs subjectivity and self in the contemporary era. The conception of self has changed from autonomous, atomised self to a new individualised or enterprising self.

For Rose (1990) the image of an ‘enterprising self’, was so potent because it was not an idiosyncratic obsession of the right of the political spectrum, to the contrary, it resonated with basic presuppositions concerning human being that remain to this day widely distributed amongst all political persuasions. Rose (1990: 151) sums up these presuppositions regarding the self as follows: the self is to

- be a subjective being;
- aspire to autonomy;
- strive for personal fulfilment in its earthly life;
- interpret its reality and destiny as a matter of individual responsibility;
- find meaning in its existence by shaping its life through acts of choice.

The charting of the rise of the dominant discourse of self is echoed by Bauman (2000, 2009). For Bauman (2000: 21-2) the process of individualization at the heart of self development essentially ‘consists of transforming human identity from a “given into a task”, and charging the actors with the responsibility for performing that task and for the consequences (also the side-effects) of their performance’.

The arrival of a departure of the postmodern where the deconstruction and reconstruction of the self is fluid, fragmentary, discontinuous, decentred, dispersed, culturally eclectic and hybrid-like (Elliot & du Gay, 2009; xii). The argument for the destruction of the self is in the
wake of the collapse of the modernist grand narratives of reason, truth, progress and universal freedom. For example, Bauman (2009) emphasises the decentred character of the self in the wider circuit of globalization and ‘the atomization and privatization of life struggles, self-propelling and self-perpetuating’ where the interior life of the subject, the self, became coterminous with the supremacy of the signifier.

Rose (1990: 3) argues the image of the self has come under question both practically and conceptually. The self is ‘coherent, bounded individualized, intentional, the locus of thought, action, and belief, the origin of its own actions, the beneficiary of a unique biography’. This fixed and frozen entity of identity of our history, heritage and experience, characterised by a profound inwardness of a regulatory ideal of an ‘internal universe of the self’ has undergone contemporary challenge. For example, the self has been technologically invaded, turned outwards and inwards to the point where Haraway (1991) refers to the ‘cyborg’ self.

The ‘individualized self’ under modernisation and the emergent discourse of the twentieth century is captured by Geertz (1979: 229) who states

> [t]he Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement and action, organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of world’s cultures.

There is a wealth of localised, specific, culturally diverse and contested notions of the self. The rigidity and lack of temporal understanding of the self is, as Charles Taylor suggests, ‘a function of a historically limited mode of self interpretation, one which has become dominant in the modern West and which may indeed spread thence to other parts of the globe, but which has a beginning in time and space and may have an end’ (Taylor, 1989: 111).

Reflexively, we can recognise that the individual self is located within a number of technological discourses derived from education, social psychology, and professional
practice which deserves reflection on the historical development of this idea in the work of Foucault given the competing and conflicting technologies at work on the self.

By historicising questions of ontology, Foucault’s understanding of self found expression in his emphasis upon power, from the Latin, *posse*, to be able, as a productive force, and its relationship with particular inventions of ‘the self’. As Rose (1990: 152) indicates, ‘the autonomous subjectivity of the modern self’ may seem the antithesis of political power, but Foucault (1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1981 [1976]) suggests an exploration of the ways in which this autonomization of the self is a central feature of contemporary ‘governmentality’ or ‘mentalities of government’. Rose’s notion of governmentality encompasses the ‘the multiple strategies, tactics, calculations, and reflections that have sought to conduct the conduct of human beings’ (Rose, 1990: 152). The ‘contact between technologies of domination of others and those of the self’ is what Foucault (1988: 19) calls governmentality. The development of the self is always in danger of being rendered as one such tactic or governmentality. An emerging critical approach to the powers of government in relation to the self (Dean, 2010; Foucault 2007) provides two productive avenues of exploration.

Technologies of the self are the methods, techniques and ‘tools’ by which human beings constitute themselves. These are the forms of knowledge and strategies that ‘permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (Foucault, 1988: 19).

In his later writings Foucault’s historicist analysis of power as a productive social force provides a particular focus upon *The Technologies of the Self* and suggests a heterogeneous range of techniques of subjectification through which human beings are urged to become more ethical beings. Foucault’s writings imply that amongst individuals such techniques provide grounds for defining their identities and in regulating themselves in accordance with the moral codes inscribed within the space produced by the institutional apparatus of the professions and higher education.
Throughout his work Foucault has concerned himself largely with the technologies of power and domination, whereby the self has been objectified through scientific inquiry and how the self constitutes itself as subject (Foucault, 1988). He also argues that ‘know thyself’ ‘constitutes the fundamental principles’ and has inverted the importance of ‘take care of yourself’.

Foucault understood technologies of the self as a multiplicity of ‘operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being’ that people make either by themselves or with the help of others, so opening the possibility of reaching a state of ‘happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality’ (Foucault, 1988: 18). In the context of social work, this can be interpreted as particular operations on the body of students that are undertaken by the students themselves, sometimes with the support of others in order to enhance the wisdom of their actions in making inquiries about an aspect of their own professional work.

Development of the self therefore embodies two inter-related dimensions of means-ends structured technologies of the self: the first stage is already predicated upon an ordering of human beings involved in accordance with the rationality of its own particular protocols. Secondly, in agreement with the ordering of theoretical reason (Heidegger, 1962) the precise locus for the human being is found to be one of a multiplicity of possible technological ‘inventions’ we call the self mediated by the discourses in which it may have been thrown in practice.

As a subject, the self is not defined by a series of characteristic attributes or behaviours, but is constituted by technology. As an objectivised subject the self has become dominated by technologies of power to which human beings have already submitted themselves. But, Foucault was not inviting us to accept such technologies of the self as a deterministic process from which we cannot escape (although he presents limited possibilities for resistance) but his writings provide testimony to his questioning of the origins of such technologies. Foucault’s (2002 [1966]) desire had been already made tangible in his earlier writings in *The Order of Things* to help his readers free themselves from understandings of
the self as a subject. In his first chapter, ‘Las Meninas’, Foucault brings to the attention of his readers the painter, Velazquez’s, pictorial opening to The Order of Things, in which ‘the subject is elided’ (2002:18). In one short chapter the very existence of the subject is open to question and his work problematises any finality of a fixed self and this self, just as it has been created, can be erased.

Having posited the possibility of the self constituted by technologies and discourse or the disciplining knowledge, power and practices, the discussion will now turn to the profession of social work and social work education.

**The self in social work**

Having reviewed the conceptualisation of the self in Western philosophical tradition, the discussion now turns to the application of this understanding to social work and to social work education.

One of the problems identified early on, with considering topics like the self, self-concept, self-esteem and self-actualisation within social work, is the feeling that in so doing we are practicing a form of narcissism or of self-actualisation (Shaw, 1974: 102). It is also highly conducive to a neo-liberal agenda where conceptions of the self become an objectified and commodified continual process of improvement. Shaw (1974: 102) argues that conception of the self and its consideration ‘is a concern with self-development’ and there is nothing intrinsically or ethically wrong with ‘constructive self-concern’. Indeed, this carries echoes for the reflective practitioner of ancient Greek wisdom to ‘know thyself’, although Foucault has historicised this ontological development and the individualising discourse of self in social work is seen to emerge. Shaw strongly presents this self-concerned self within social work.

The self as self-actualisation through the work of Maslow, Rogers, Jung, Reich, and Allport (Shaw, 1974) have all contributed to a codified notion of the self as embedded in a linear process of progress to some actualisable ending - a static and frozen movement of the individual in a quest for self-actualisation. This approach has developed in ‘self- theory’ (Shaw, 1974) and has distinct applications for social work practice and education, beginning
with a ‘soul-searching’ of the beginnings of social work in philanthropy and charitable trusts of the nineteenth century, and working through the application of interventions, group work, hierarchy of needs and the way that self-actualisation theory ‘is primarily a challenge to oneself’ (Shaw, 1974: 103). The conceptualisation of the self although reflective in part has a deeply ingrained telos and progressive development to an achievable state of self knowledge and self-realisation. Shaw locates and positions Rogers (1965), Argyris (1965) and Maslow (1954) in this self-actualising tendency that are consistent with the existing structures, organisation and socialisation of the ‘self’. This self consists of sets of attitudes and beliefs, the filter through which experience is mediated, the framework of meanings and guides for action.

Contemporary and seminal social work is informed by Coulshed and Orme’s (2006) work that states, professional social work practice requires that workers deploy a wide-ranging repertoire of skills, underpinned by a value base that respect others’, ‘to respond to the diversity and experiences and reactions that are encountered when working with fellow human beings’ (Coulshed & Orme, 2006: 18). Even with the recognition of the complex interaction between knowledge and process, challenging notions of who produces knowledge, how it is used and what the implications for practice are, they still conceive of the social worker as self that has strong echoes with an individualised self, cognisant of relationships and others, but focused on the unstable and historically contingent self.

Harrison and Ruch (2007) suggest there is a heightened trend since the late 1980s that places less importance on the ‘self’ in social work practice and education although any reference to the ‘self’ does not appear in National Occupational Standards with an attendant danger of a ‘self-less’ approach resorting to ‘doing’ rather than ‘being’ social workers. The professional discourse and technologies at work on the self in social work bring the doing self through technologies of performance rather than the being self.

Social worker’s use of self has been conceptualized in different ways throughout the literature, there appears to be a lack of research regarding how social workers describe and involve the self that they bring to their therapeutic and non-therapeutic work (Rupert,
In interviews about their experience of self, practitioners described the self that they brought to their work as individualistic, though at the same time stressed the importance of self when interacting with others. Since the inception of social work social workers have noted the importance of relationship in practice. More recently clinicians and other social workers have developed the term ‘use of self’ to indicate important aspects of the professional relationship. How that term is defined rests on how one conceptualizes ‘self’. From a relational perspective the concept of self changes from the notion of self as separate and constant to self as process in interaction (Arnd-Caddigan & Pozzuto, 2008). This move has the positive development of a recognition of the fluidity and flexibility of the self but neglects any recognition of the technologies at work defining the self as an object to be manipulated and disciplined within the professional practice.

Identifying social workers as ‘instruments of change’ Heydt and Sherman (2005) argue conscious use of self is the term used by social workers to describe the skill of purposefully and intentionally using ‘his or her motivation and capacity to communicate and interact with others in ways that facilitate change’ (Sheafor & Horejsi, 2003: 69). From an American perspective, they argue conscious use of self is not a new concept in social work. Various authors (Lee, 1983; Leiby, 1997; Jacobson, 2001) have identified the shift in social work from its early emphasis on social reform to its current emphasis on clinical practice also appears to have shifted the focus from conscious use of self at multiple levels of intervention to self-awareness within a one-on-one helping relationship. It has also turned the process from an experiential exploration of ‘self’ to an instrument of practice. Arguably, this move of the self in the profession of social work has shifted a conflicting and multiple notion of self to a fixed, technologically determined and discursively constructed objective instrument. Neuman and Friedman (1997) emphasize the importance of self-awareness and conscious use of self in the building of the relationship by identifying two key ingredients: self-awareness through mastery of one’s feelings and motivations as well as understanding how he or she is perceived by clients. Presenting a simple and linear causal connection Heydt and Sherman (2005) argue the worker’s skill in this process builds the relationship with client to deliver outcomes for practice. Reviewing a range of teaching strategies, (role-play, visual methodologies, case-studies, videoing, self-reflection), Heydt and Sherman (2005: 35) argues for conscious use of the self as a ‘tuning one own’s instrument’, although they do
recognise risks in self-disclosure and the need for boundaries and confidentiality. Arguably, this move to the instrumentality of self deepens and strengthens the technological determination of self in social work.

Similarly, Jacobson (2001: 55) argues ‘clinical practitioners are taught that self-knowledge is vital to detecting transference, counter transference, and other dynamics in the therapeutic relationship. But, although key to therapeutic practice, such efforts to ‘know oneself’ have not been emphasized as a foundation for non-clinical social work activities, such as income maintenance work, employment training, child welfare, or nutritional support’. Using the code of the conscious use of the self is presented as a necessary precondition for becoming an instrument of change.

Miehls and Moffat (2000) suggest the social work identity is conceptualized based on concepts of the self (Foucault, 1988), rather than concepts associated with ego psychology. Social work students, teachers and practitioners have historically attempted to gain a sense of ego mastery and control by the acquisition of theory to enhance skill-based practice expertise. In so doing, they have attempted to manage anxiety as a means to enhance learning. Traditional social work functions such as acceptance, non-judgemental attitudes, and empathy (Biestek, 1957) have been utilized to encourage practitioners to manage their feelings related to difference. Miehls and Moffat (2000) argue, however, that the social work identity is enriched when social workers allow their selves to be in a state of disassembly in the presence of the other. When social workers experience their selves as complex and dialogical, they are more open to the influence of the other and they make the case for practitioners to work on a reflexive self rather than attempting to achieve ego control through the management of anxiety.

So it would appear that the self in social work has moved from the self-theory of self-actualisation, to a relational self constituted by others, elided from official discourses, constructed as an instrument of change and presented in an anxious state of disassembly.
Social work education and experiential and reflective learning

Ruch (2000) presents an argument of the self in reflective learning using a narrative, auto-ethnographic approach to illustrate the complexities and potential of reflective learning, providing a theoretical account of the nature of reflective learning and an outline of the reflection process for an autobiographical account which provides an example of the reflective learning process. The key themes of holistic approaches to learning, the significance of the self and multiple subjectivities, the personal in the professional and the importance of attending to the process and content of learning are explored. Examples of shortcomings in institutional learning environment are included and drawn on to highlight the potential for more reflective approaches within the social work education system. Ruch (2000) suggests that given the anxiety-provoking nature of the situations student practitioners face, they need to embrace reflective learning if they are to avoid becoming restrictive, routinised and ritualistic in their practice. The use of the self in research in social work practice has focused on the qualitative methodologies of auto/ethnography and narrative approaches to research and is fundamental to understanding of reflexive practice in social work education.

The resurgent interest in the professional relationship can partly be understood as a response to the neo-liberal agenda of economically driven and managerially dominated practice contexts that foster a reductive perception of individuals as rational consumers or commissioners of service (Harrison & Ruch, 2007: 44). In the current climate, with the pressures of the age of austerity, it is anticipated that further reduction in any focus on the self in the relationship-based helping professions will ensue. The demands of cost effectiveness, values for money, target driven economically determined service evaluation will further exacerbate the eliding of the subject, the reduction to a parsimonious self, and a diminished ability to re-invigorate the importance of the self in helping.

Conclusion

This paper has reviewed the historic understanding of conceptions of the self. The application of conceptions of the self to social work, social work practice and social work education suggests three dominant themes that emerge in relation to the self. A North American conception of the ‘conscious use of the self as an instrument of change’, a UK
based ‘use of the self’ and a focus on the disassembly of the self. It has been suggested that both these conceptions carry with them the implicit difficulties of the objectifying process of instrumental rationality that distances ‘social work’ from the richness, diversity and insight of subjectivities, positionality, explorations of the self in a helping process through the value of experiential and reflective learning. These forms of learning need to form the platform for future work based learning and inform the curricula of all forms of social practice in social work and social care. Pedagogical experience and insight should create space for moments of a disassembled self to explore conception of the self being employed in professional practice. The social work education and practice needs to take account of the mobility of self in its engagement with the everyday and the fluidity and relational nature of the conception of the self rather than the absent or fixed current self.

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References


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